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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, XG

SUBJ: "WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS" GROUP AT THE UN IN
1974

BEGIN SUMMARY: IT WAS A BAD YEAR AT THE UN FOR THE "WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS" (WEO) GROUP, SEEKING TO PLACATE THE OIL PRODUCERS AND THE NON-ALIGNED BLOC GENERALLY, THE WEO'S PARTED COMPANY WITH THE US ON MORE ISSUES THAN IN PAST SESSIONS. HOWEVER, DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE EC-9 WAS EFFECTIVE IN MOST SITUATIONS AND SOMETIMES PREVENTED ONE OR MORE MEMBERS CAVING TO THIRD WORLD PRESSURE, AND PROSPECTS FOR US COLLABORATION IN THE NEAR TERM WITH MANY WEO COUNTRIES HAVE IMPROVED IN THE WAKE OF THE SCALI DECEMBER SPEECH. FRANCE WAS STILL THE PRINCIPAL DEVIANT OF THE NINE BUT SOMEWHAT LESS SO THAN IN PAST YEARS, AND THERE WAS IMPROVEMENT IN ITS RELATIONS WITH US. US AND THE EC-9 WERE CLOSER IN SECOND COMMITTEE. OUTSIDE THE EC, THERE WAS A BROAD SPECTRUM OF WEO VOTING PATTERNS, RANGING FROM CANADA WHICH DIFFERED LITTLE FROM THE EC, THROUGH THE MORE LIBERAL NORDICS, THE AUSTRIAN AND FINNISH VARIETIES OF NEUTRALITY, TO THE INCREASINGLY BUT SELECTIVELY THIRD-WORLDISH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. FINALLY, SPAIN, PORTUGAL, GREECE, AND TURKEY ARE IN A CLASS BY THEMSELVES, AND ONLY ON A FEW OF THE MAJOR CONTENTIOUS QUESTIONS DID THEY LINE UP WITH THE EC, MUCH LESS THE US. NON-ALIGNED MALTA IS A MISFIT IN THE GROUP. JAPAN ACUTALLY AN ASIAN GROUP MEMBER BUT OFTEN IDENTIFYING ITSELF WITH THE WEO'S) MOVED SHARPLY TOWARD ARAB AND AFRICAN POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. DISARRAY IN THE WESTERN CAMP

THE "WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS" (WEO) GROUP AT THE UN COMPRISES ALL NON-COMMUNIST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (INCLUDING MALTA AND TURKEY, BUT NOT CYPRUS) TOGETHER WITH CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND. ITS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY CORE IN PARTICULAR WAS LEFT IN SOME DISARRAY BY THE TUMULTUOUS EVENTS OF 1974. WEO CYNICISM ABOUT THE UN HAS NEVER BEEN GREATER THAN NOW, AND IT WOULD TAKE A MAJOR CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS TO REVERSE SHARPLY THE GROUP'S INCREASING TENDENCY TO YIELD
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TO THE PRESSURES OF THE THE NON-ALIGNED MAJORITY HERE. NEVERTHELESS, MOST WEO COUNTRIES ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED AT THE GROWING IRRESPONSIBILITY OF GA MAJORITIES, AND SEVERAL PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE GROUP FOUND THE COURAGE (WITH LITTLE OR NO PROMPTING FROM US) TO SPEAK OUT STRONGLY ABOUT IT BEFORE AND AFTER AMBASSADOR SCALI'S LANDMARK SPEECH IN DECEMBER. FURTHERMORE, THE WEO GROUP FOR THE MOST PART IS STILL THE ONLY GROUP WHICH CAN BE COUNTED ON TO JUDGE ISSUES ON THEIR

MERITS EVEN IF IT HAS BECOME MORE INCLINED TO COMPROMISE
WHEN THE ROLL IS CALLED.

2. THE MALAISE IS MOST PRONOUNCED AMONG THE NINE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
NATIONS AND OTHERS OF GENERALLY LIKE MIND SUCH AS CANADA AND TO A
LESSER EXTENT THE NORDIC GROUP. MANY OF THE NON-EC SOUTHERN
EUROPEAN WEO'S -PORTUGAL, SPAIN, GREECE, TURKEY--AND THE
ASIAN PERIPHERY MEMBERS-AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN (AN ASIAN
GROUP MEMBER WHICH OFTEN THINKS OF ITSELF MORE AS A WEO) ALREADY
BEFORE THIS YEAR WERE INCREASINGLY IDENTIFYING THEMSELVES WITH
NON-ALIGNED CAUSES, AND THIS TREND CONTINUED, FACILITATED BY NEW
GOVERNMENTS IN PORTUGAL AND GREECE, ALTHOUGH SOME HAD MISGIVINGS.

3. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT WEO CYNICISM IS SELEVTIVE. IN SOME AREAS,

SUCH AS SOUTHER AFRICAN ISSUES, ATTACHMENT TO PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN
GREATLY ERODED, WHILE IN OTHERS-FOR EXAMPLE, THE BASIC QUESTIONS
OF THE RULE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE AND ADHERENCE TO THE CHARTER,
MOST MEMBERS OF THE WEO GROUP ARE RESISTING MAJORITY PRESSURE.
MOREOVER, THERE WAS CLOSER COORDINATION AND MORE UNIFORM VOTING
BETWEEN THE US AND AT LEAST THE EC-9 IN THE SECOND COMMITTEE
IN 1974 THEN IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR.

4. THE EC-9

THE EC-9 STROVE HARDER FOR UNITY THAN EVER BEFORE,
ALTHOUGH ON A FEW ISSUES A COMMON LINE PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO ATTAIN.
(PARENTHETICALLY, OBSERVER STATUS AT THE GA FOR THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SAILED THROUGH WITH THE INEVITABLE CEMA OBSERVE
STATUS APPROVAL IN TRAIN. BOTH, HOWEVER, SEEMED IRRELEVANT TO THE
THIRD WORLD/WEST CONTENTION WHICH KEPT THE UN AGITATED ALL YEAR).
THE GROUP UMBRELLA SOMETIMES GAVE EC COUNTRIES COURAGE TO TAKE
UNPOPULAR POSITIONS WHICH INDIVIDUALLY THEY WOULD HAVE FEARED
DOING. THIS COULD WORK THE OTHER WAY, HOWEVER, AND WE WERE MORE
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THAN ONCE TOLD BY THE UK OR FRG THAT THEY COULD NOT JOIN US IN
VOTING AGAINST AN ANTI-WESTERN RESOLUTION BECAUSE EC DISCIPLINE
DEMANDED A COMMON ABSTENTION.

SOME SPLITS WITHIN THE EC DID OCCUR, HOWEVER, AT THE 29TH GA,
FALLING INTO THREE MAJOR CATEGORIES: VOTES WHERE FRANCE DIFFERED
FROM ALL THE OTHERS, A FAMILIAR PHENOMENON FROM PREVIOUS YEARS;
VOTES WHERE A MINORITY OF EC COUNTRIES-MOST OFTEN IRELAND, DENMARK
ITALY-TOOK "SOFTER" POSITIONS THAN THE OTHERS; VOTES WHERE THE UN
AND FRANCE, OFTEN JOINING THE US, TOOK "HARDER" POSITIONS THAN THEIR
BRETHREN.

5. FRANCE GOES IT ALONE LESS

THE FRENCH DEVIANCY SEEMS TO BE GETTING LESS PRONOUNCED AND
IS COMSPICUOUS NOW MAINLY ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS AND IN SOME
DISARMAMENT AREAS, PARTICULARLY WHERE THE NPT AND NUCLEAR TESTING

ARE CONCERNED. NOTABLE SOLO FRENCH DEFECTIONS FROM THE EC LINE THIS FALL WERE THE PLO OBSERVER STATUS RESOLUTION, WHERE FRANCE ABSTAINED AND THE OTHER EIGHT (AND THE US VOTED NO; THE ASEAN-SPONSORED CAMBODIA RESOLUTION, SUPPORTED BY ALL THE EC (AND THE US) SAVE FRANCE WHICH ABSTAINED; THE SPANISH SAHARA RESOLUTION FAVORING MOROCCO, WHICH FRANCE (AND THE US) SUPPORTED WHILE THE OTHER EIGHT ABSTAINED; AND THE AUSTRALIAN-SPONSORED PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES RESOLUTION WHICH THE US AND ALL EC BUT FRANCE HAD LITTLE TROUBLE SUPPORTING, BUT WHICH DREW A FRENCH ABSTENTION ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FRENCH HELPED BY SUBMITTING AN AMENDMENT TO THE "FRIENDLY" KOREA RESOLUTION WHICH MADE IT MORE ATTRACTIVE TO THE NORDICS AND SOME NON-ALIGNED AND HELPED PROVIDE THE SUBSTANTIAL VICTORY MARGIN. IT CAN BE ARGUED OF COURSE THAT THE OTHER EC MEMBERS WERE SUCH A STRONG FORCE ON THIS SUBJECT THAT FRANCE FELT COMPELLED TO CLIMB ABOARD SOMEHOW.

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DESPITE THE CONTINUED FRENCH PENCHANT FOR FOLLOWING ITS OWN PATH, THE GISCARD ELECTION HAS BEEN REFLECTED HERE IN A BETTER-OILED FRENCH RELATIONSHIP NOT ONLY WITH ITS EC COLLEAGUES BUT WITH THE US. FRENCH CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE EC GROUP DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 1974 WAS EXERCISED WITH CARE AND FINESSE. WE FOUND OUR FRENCH COUNTERPARTS AT EVERY LEVEL MORE APPROACHABLE AND COMMUNICATIVE THIS FALL EVEN WHERE THE GAP IN OUR VIEWS COULD NOT BE BRIDGED. IN FACT THEY FREQUENTLY SOUGHT US OUT FOR GREATER CONSULTATION. FRANCE WAS FIRST TO INDICATE ITS INTENTION TO ADDRESS QUESTION OF MAJORITY ABUSE OF GA.

6. WHERE THE EC SPLIT

THE MOST NOTORIOUS CASE WHERE A MINORITY OF EC COUNTRIES TOOK A SOFTER POSITION THAN THE OTHERS WAS THE PLO INVITATION, ON WHICH ITALY AND IRELAND JOINED FRANCE TO SUPPORT THE PLO, WHILE THE REST ABSTAINED (US VOTED NO). THIS SPLIT SPEAR-HEADED BY FRANCE WAS UNQUESTIONABLY THE MOST TRAUMATIC OF RECENT DISAGREEMENTS AMONG THE NINE. MAJOR WORK WAS LATER DONE IN CAPITALS TO REACH EC UNITY ON THE PLO ISSUES, RESULTING IN UNIFORM ABSTENTION ON THE SUBSTANTIVE PLO RESOLUTION AND A UNIFORM NEGATIVE EXCEPT FOR FRANCE'S ABSTENTION ON THE OBSERVER STATUS QUESTION. ON A PARTICULARLY LONG AND HARD-FOUGHT ISSUE, THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (CERDS), IT WAS AGAIN FRANCE, ITALY, AND IRELAND, PLUS THE NETHERLANDS, WHO COULD NOT BRING THEMSELVES TO VOTE AGAINST THE CHARTER AS A WHOLE. THEY ABSTAINED, WHILE THE OTHER EC COUNTRIES VOTED NO ALONG WITH THE US. THE PROLONGED SQUIRMING IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS TO AVOID BEING ISOLATED ALONE WITH THE US IN OPPOSITION TO CERDS WAS PAINFULLY PALPABLE.

THE OTHER INSTANCES WHERE THERE WERE SOFT DEFECTIONS USUALLY INVOLVED IRELAND, WITH ITS COLONIAL MEMORIES, AND DENMARK, MAGNETIZED TO SOME EXTENT BY THE MORE LIBERAL NON-EC FELLOW NORDICS. THUS IRELAND AND DENMARK SUPPORTED TWO APARTHEID RESOLUTIONS ON WHICH THE OTHER SEVEN EC ABSTAINED. JOINED BY ITALY, THEY BACKED A RESOLUTION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES

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AND PEOPLES, WHERE THE EC MAJORITY (AND THE US) ABSTAINED. ON TWO DISARMAMENT RESOLUTIONS, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND A CALL FOR MORE PRODUCTIVE SALT NEGOTIATIONS, IT WAS AGAIN IRELAND AND DENMARK, JOINED THIS TIME BY THE NETHERLANDS, WHICH VOTED AFFIRMATIVELY IN THE FACE OF MAJORITY EC (AND US) ABSTENTION (FRANCE VOTED NO ON THE TEST BAN RESOLUTION). IRELAND WAS THE ONLY EC COUNTRY TO SUPPORT A FOURTH COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES; THE OTHER EIGHT (AND THE US) ABSTAINED.

VOTES WHERE A SMALL EC MINORITY TOOK A HARDER POSITION THAN THE OTHERS, THEREBY LINING UP WITH THE US, ALWAYS INVOLVED EITHER THE UK OR FRANCE OR BOTH. THIS WAS A MIXED BAG OF ISSUES, RANGING FROM UN INTERNAL OR STRUCTURAL MATTERS SUCH AS CHARTER REVIEW (UK AND FRANCE ALONE IN THE EC VOTING NO ALONG WITH US) AND PAY RAISE AND BUDGET (FRANCE AND ITALY VOTED WITH THE US AGAINST THE PAY RAISE AND ABSTAINED WITH THE US ON THE BUDGET; THE OTHER SEVEN VOTED FOR BOTH), THROUGH THE SWEDISH-SPONSORED NAPALM RESOLUTION (UK AND FRANCE ALONE ABSTAINED WITH THE US) AND THE SOUTH ASIA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE RESOLUTIONS (UK, FRANCE, AND DENMARK ABSTAINED AS DID THE US; OTHERS VOTED YES) TO SOME ASSORTED COLONIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES, VIZ, INFORMATION FROM NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES (UK AND FRANCE ABSTAINED WITH US), SECOND GENERAL CONFERENCE OF UNIDO (UK AND FRG ABSTAINED WITH US), AND PRICE INDEXATION (UK, FRG AND BELGIUM ABSTAINED; US VOTED NO).

7. UK CONCERNED

THE UK CONCERN ABOUT TRENDS AT THE UN IS AS STRONG AS THAT OF MOST OF ITS EC PARTNERS, AND HAS BEEN WELL ARTICULATED PRIVATELY BY ITS EXTREMELY ABLE AMBASSADOR IVOR RICHARD AND SUCH DISTINGUISHED 29TH GA DELEGATES AS ITS THIRD COMMITTEE REP LADY GAITSKELL. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS A RESIDUE OF TRADITIONAL LABOR GOVERNMENT GOOD WILL TOWARD THE UN WHICH WILL NOT DISSIPATE OVERNIGHT, AND IS PERHAPS REFLECTED IN FAVORABLE UK VOTES ON THE UN PAY RAISE AND BUDGET. IT IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE DECISION TO RESUME TESTIFYING BEFORE AND TO ACCEPT VISITING MISSIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE OF 24.

8. ITALY FLOUNDERS

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ITALY WAS HAMPERED BY A WEAK AMBASSADOR, UNSTEADY INSTRUCTIONS FROM ROME, AND A LINGERING OBSESSION TO WIN A PERMANENT PLACE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AN OBSESSION WHICH LAY BEHIND ITS VOTE (UNIQUE IN THE EC) FAVORING CREATION OF A CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE. ITALY, HOWEVER, REMAINS AN IMPORTANT FORCE WITHIN THE EC-9 AT THE UN AND IS LIKELY TO BE MORE OUT-SPOKEN NOW THAT ITS TWO-YEAR STING ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS BEGUN UNLESS GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITIES LEAD IT TO CONTINUED VACILLATION.

9. FRG MORE ACTIVE

THE FRG EMERGED NOTICEABLY FROM ITS SHELL THIS YEAR, AND BY THE END OF THE GA SESSION WAS SHOWING CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENCE (OR A PREFERENCE FOR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US?) WITH ITS WILLINGNESS TO VOTE NO ON CERDS, TO PARTICIPATE IN THE KOREA CORE GROUP, TO JOIN THE US IN REFUSING TO SERVE ON THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE UN SPECIAL FUND, AND IN A FEW OTHER DECISIONS.

IT WAS PARTICULARLY TOUGH ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS, SOMETIMES MORE SO THAN THE US. HOWEVER, IN MOST OF THE STANDARD AREAS OF UN DEBATE SUCH AS DISARMAMENT THE FRG STILL PREFERRED TO KEEP ITS HEAD LOW AND VOTE CLOSELY IN LINE WITH ITS EC PARTNERS. WE ARE TOLD THERE ARE SEVERAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN THE BONN GOVERNMENT ABOUT UN POLICY, BUT FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IS STRONGLY DISPOSED TO TAKE A TOUCH UNYIELDING STAND ON ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE STRONG FRG SPEECH DURING THE DECEMBER DEBATE.

10. SWEDISH PERFORMANCE MIXED

SWEDEN, WHICH ENJOYS INFLUENCE HERE OUT OF PROPORTION TO ITS SIZE, HAD A MIXED VOTING RECORD AS USUAL, SOFT ON MANY ECONOMIC AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES, BUT HARD ON BASIC QUESTIONS OF ADHERENCE TO LAW AND PRECEDENT, WHICH HAS BEEN A TRADITIONAL SWEDISH POSITION, WELCOME PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF SWEDEN'S ASSUMPTION THIS MONTH OF A NON-PERMANENT SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SWEDISH PERMREP RYDBECK DELIVERED ONE OF THE MOST HELPFUL SPEECHES IN THE DECEMBER DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF THE UN. SWEDEN BACKED THE "FRIENDLY" KOREAN RESOLUTION, ALTHOUGH

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IT ABSTAINED ON THE CAMBODIAN QUESTION. THE SWEDES WERE PARTICULARLY RESISTANT TO THIRD WORLD PRESSURES ON AFRICAN ISSUES, REJECTING THE FIRST REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, REJECTING BOUTEFILKA'S LATER RULING ON SOUTH AFRICA, AND ABSTAINING ALONG WITH THE US AND THE EC ON THE NAMIBIA AND SOUTHERN RHODESIA RESOLUTIONS. (THERE WERE A FEW OTHER AFRICAN VOTES, HOWEVER, WHERE SWEDEN RODE WITH THE MAJORITY.) SWEDEN WAS ELOQUENT ON THE NEED FOR ATTENTION TO THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEM, AND IT LED A SUCCESSFUL MOVE TO MAKE SOME HELPFUL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE RESOLUTION.

ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS, SWEDEN USED DISCRIMINATION, APPROVING THE PLO INVITATION BUT ABSTAINING ON THE OTHER PLO RESOLUTIONS AND VOTING LIKE THE EC-9 ON ALL "ISRAELI PRACTICES" RESOLUTIONS AS WELL AS THE QUESTION OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. ON A VARIETY OF COLONIALISM QUESTIONS (THE CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDS RESOLUTIONS, THE THIRD COMMITTEE SELF-DETERMINATION RESOLUTION) SWEDEN REFRAINED FROM TAKING THE POPULAR APPROACH. HOWEVER, WHENEVER WESTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD WERE TARGETED, SWEDEN USUALLY VOTED LIKE A THIRD WORLDER. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SUPPORTED CERDS, THE FIRST COMMITTEE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY RESOLUTION, A SECOND COMMITTEE RESOLUTION WHICH REAFFIRMED THE RIGHT TO "PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY" OVER NATURAL RESOURCES, AND A FOURTH COMMITTEE RESOLUTION ON ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN AFRICA, ON NONE OF WHICH IT HAD ANY US OR EC COMPANY. MINISTER LIDBOM'S SPEECH IN THE THIRD COMMITTEE IN NOVEMBER WAS INDICATIVE OF THE SWEDISH APPROACH, EXTREMELY TOUGH ON ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM, BOTH US AND SOVIET.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USUN 0328

11. JAPAN UNDER PRESSURE

JAPAN LABORED LONG AND HARD AT THE 29TH GA ON THE CAMBODIA AND KOREA ISSUES, AND THIS WAS A VITAL COMPONENT OF OUR ACHIEVEMENTS ON BOTH ISSUES. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE MISSION CONTINUED TO BE EXTREMELY CLOSE AND ANY INDICATION OF STRONG US INTEREST IN AN ISSUE WAS TAKEN WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS BY THE JAPANESE. NEVERTHELESS, THE GAP WIDENED BETWEEN JAPANESE AND US POSITIONS ON SOME

QUESTIONS, AS THE JAPANESE SCRABBLED TO PROTECT THEIR OIL IMPORTS AND TO CURRY FAVOR WITH THE AFRICAN BLOC BECAUSE OF INCREASING SENSITIVITY TO AFRICAN CRITICISM OF JAPANESE AFRICAN POLICY. JAPAN SUPPORTED THE PLO INVITATION, ABSTAINED ON THE SUBSTANTIVE PLO RESOLUTION AND AGAIN ON THE PLO OBSERVER STATUS RESOLUTION. ON THE ISRAELI PRACTICES RESOLUTIONS, IT STAYED IN LINE WITH

THE EC, BUT UNLIKE THE EC IT SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION ON PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. IT ABSTAINED ON CERDS. ON MOST CONTENTIOUS AFRICAN RESOLUTIONS JAPAN WAS FAR OUT IN FRONT OF THE EC, ABSTAINING IN THE FACE OF A UNANIMOUS EC NO ONE THE REPORT REJECTING SOUTH AFRICAN CREDENTIALS AS WELL AS ON BOUTEFILKA'S SOUTH AFRICAN SUSPENSION RULING, AND DIVERGING ALSO ON APARTHEID AND THE SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA RESOLUTIONS. DESPITE CLEAR JAPANESE DISTASTE FOR CERDS AND OUR STRONG CAMPAIGN FOR "NO" VOTES, TOKYO DECIDED ON ABSTENTION. JAPAN BACKED THE CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE ALTHOUGH BEHIND THE SCENES IT ATTEMPTED TO DISENGAGE ITSELF FROM COMMITMENT TO THE IDEA OF CHARTER AMENDMENT WHICH IT BEGAN TO SEE MIGHT NOT SERVE ITS INTERESTS. ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS, JAPAN WAS MORE OFTEN THAN NOT HELPFUL TO US, PLAYING AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN SUPPORT OF NON-PROLIFERATION.

12. AUSTRALIA CONTINUES ACTIVE

THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION, COMPLETING ITS SECOND YEAR ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WEARING ITS AMBITION FOR THE 30 TH GA PRESIDENCY ON ITS SLEEVE, CONTINUED ACTIVELY TO SEEK OUT A ROLE AS A BRIDGE FROM THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO THE LDC'S. ITS MOST SPECTACULAR DEPARTURE FROM THE TRADITIONAL WESTERN APPROACH WAS ITS SECURITY COUNCIL VOTE TO EXPEL SOUTH AFRICA, (WHILE VOTING IN GA AGAINST BOUTEFILKA'S SUSPENSION RULING)
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BUT THERE WERE MANY OTHER ISSUES DEAR TO LDC HEARS SUCH AS CERDS WHERE AUSTRALIA PARTED COMPANY WITH THE WEST. ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS, AUSTRALIA WAS AN ACTIVE DEFENDER OF THE NPT ALTHOUGH ONCE AGAIN ALONG WITH NEW ZEALAND IT TRIED TO MAKE THINGS AS UNCOMFORTABLE AS POSSIBLE FOR ALL NUCLEAR TESTING COUNTRIES. AUSTRALIA'S MOTIVES IN PUTTING FORWARD ITS DIPLOMATIC ASYLUM AND DISPUTES SETTLEMENTS RESOLUTIONS NEVER BECAME COMPLETELY CLEAR AND ALTHOUGH BOTH PASSED COMFORTABLY, THE POLITICAL BENEFIT THEY PRODUCED FOR AUSTRALIA WAS QUESTIONABLE. AUSTRALIA DREW SOVIET ANNOY-

ANCE BECAUSE OF THE DISPUTES SETTLEMENTS INITIATIVE AND THE SOVIETS APPEARED NERVOUS ALSO AT OPENING UP THE ASYLUM QUESTION. ON CAMBODIA AND KOREA, NEW ZEALAND WAS ASTAUNCH AND VIGOROUS FIGHTER ON THE US SIDE; AUSTRALIA WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL BEHIND THE SCENES ON KOREA BUT PUBLICLY WAS LESS ACTIVE THAN NEW ZEALAND. NEW ZEALAND GENERALLY LINED UP WITH AUSTRALIA ALL YEAR, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE A FEW INSTANCES WHERE NEW ZEALAND TOOK A STILL SOFTER POSITION THAN ITS NEIGHBOR (I.E. POLYINVITATION, SYRIAN RESOLUTION OUTLAWING NAPALM). DESPITE OUR MANY DIFFERENCES WITH AUSTRALIA, WE HAD MANY OCCASIONS TO BE GRATEFUL FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE, E.G., ON UNEF/UNDOF ASSESSMENTS, IN THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL, AND ON THE PUERTO RICO ISSUES IN THE COMMITTEE OF 24.

13. SPAIN, PORTUGAL, GREECE, TURKEY

DESPITE NATO OR BILATERAL TIES WITH THE US OF VARIOUS KINDS, THESE ARE ALL COUNTRIES WHO ARE INCREASINGLY PULLED TOWARD NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS AT THE UN. THE CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN LISBON AND ATHENS WERE IMMEDIATELY REFLECTED IN THEIR UN BEHAVIOR ALTHOUGH IN NEITHER CASE WAS THERE A COMPLETE TURNAROUND ON ALL ISSUES. PORTUGAL WENT TO GREAT AND SUCCESSFUL LENGTHS TO WIN PERFECT CREDENTIALS WITH THE AFRICAN BLOC, BUT SOMETIMES VOTED LIKE A WESTERNER ON ISSUES OF LITTLE INTEREST TO AFRICANS. TURKEY AND GREECE WERE ABSORBED ALL SUMMER AND FALL WITH THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THEY, PARTICULARLY TURKEY, TENDED TO LOOK ON ALL VOTES AS BARGAINING COUNTERS FOR USE IN GAINING SUPPORT FOR THEIR CYPRUS POSITION. THE ABSTENTION OF GREECE AND PORTUGAL ON THE CAMBODIA RESOLUTION WAS A DISAPPOINTMENT, BUT ALL FOUR COUNTRIES HELD WITH US ON THE KOREA QUESTION. (HOWEVER, SPAIN'S ABSTENTION ON EVERY KOREAN VOTE EXCEPT THE MAIN ONE WAS A BRUISING SURPRISING EVIDENTLY MEANT AS A REBUKE TO THE US AND JAPAN.) ON SOME DECOLONIZATION QUESTIONS SPAIN ADHERED TO ITS TRADITIONAL VIEWS, AND IT WAS THE CONFIDENTIAL

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ONLY ONE OF THE FOUR WHICH ABSTAINED RATHER THAN TO SUPPORT CERDS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO SPANISH VOTE THE ARAB BLOC HAD ANY CAUSE FOR UNHAPPINESS WITH EXCEPT THE SPANISH SAHARA ISSUE ITSELF.

14. WHITHER US - WEO RELATIONS AT THE UN?

RATHER THAN FUNCTION AS A MEMBER OF THE WEO GROUP FOR ALL PURPOSES, THE US HAS ALWAYS PREFERRED TO PRESERVE A UNIQUE SPECIAL STATUS INDEPENDENT OF REGIONAL BLOCs, COUNTING ON UN TRADITION TO GUARANTEE IT REPRESENTATION QU A SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBER ON ALL UN BODIES. THE US HAS HOWEVER CONSULTED FREQUENTLY WITH WEO MEMBERS AND IN SOME UN CONTENTS IS TREATED AS TANTAMOUNT TO A WEO. THUS, IN THE SECOND (ECONOMIC, 3RD (SOCIAL) FIFTH (UN ADMINISTRATIVE) AND SIXTH (LEGAL) COMMITTEES THE US HAS BEEN A REGULAR PARTICIPANT IN WEO CAUCUSES, AS A MATTER OF LONG PRACTICE. A RECENT DEVELOPMENT IS THAT THE US IS INVITED TO AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL WEO MEETINGS FOR DISCUSSION OF CANDIDACY QUESTIONS. THE UNITED STATES, DESPITE ITS PARTICIPATION IN WEO MEETINGS WHERE CANDIDACIES ARE DISCUSSED, HAS INSISTED ON ITS RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION WITHOUT REGARD TO REGIONAL IDENTIFICATION. NONE-THELESS, THE FACT IS THAT IN GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION PARTICIPATION BY THE US IS CHARGED TO THE WEO GROUP. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT CHINA TAKES ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POSITION IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ASIAN GROUP. IN ADDITION, THERE HAS EXISTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS AN AMBASSADORIAL FORUM FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSION WHICH MEETS INTERMITTENTLY KNOWN AS THE VINCI GROUP, CONSISTING OF THE WEO PLUS THE US AND JAPAN.

DESPITE THE GROWING US-WEO VOTING DIVERGENCE AT THE UN, AS WE TENDED INCREASINGLY TO EXPRESS OUR CONVICTIONS UN-AMBIGUOUSLY ON UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS AND AS WEO VULNERABILITY

TO LDC PRESSURE INCREASED, WE THINK A COUNTER-TREND HAS ALREADY
BEGUN TO APPEAR AND THERE WILL BE TO SOME DEGREE A RALLYING
TOGETHER OF THE US AND MANY WEO MEMBERS IN THE COMING MONTHS.
WE SENSE A STRONGER DESIRE NOW ON THE PART OF MOST
WEO COUNTRIES TO LEARN US VIEWS ON ISSUES AT AN EARLY STAGE,
TO MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH THE US AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE
AND SOMETIMES ACTIVELY TO SEEK US LEADERSHIP.
IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SCALI SPEECH IN DECEMBER AND THE
WAY IT SUCCEEDED IN PUTTING THE NON-ALIGNED MAJORITY AT LEAST
MOMENTARILY ON THE DEFENSIVE WAS ON THE WHOLE A TONIC FOR MOST
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WEO'S WE SHOULD FOLLOW THROUGH BY ENGAGING IN THOROUGH AND
EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH WEO DELEGATIONS ON ALL UN QUESTIONS.
WHILE ITS EC PLUS CANADA AND JAPAN CORE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN
OUR CLOSEST COLLABORATORS, ON AN AD HOC BASIS WE WILL CONSULT
MORE WIDELY, AND FOR SYMPOLIC REASONS WE WILL NORMALLY RESPOND
AFFIRMATIVELY TO ALL WEO INVITATIONS TO BE PRESENT AT
AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL CANDIDACY MEETINGS.
SCALI

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